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I. INTRODUCTION
For many years controversy has been escalating about the appropriate
method of implying a statute of limitations in private actions brought under
Rule 10b-5, which was created by the Securities and Exchange Commission
pursuant to rulemaking powers granted in section 10(b) of the 1934 Securi-
ties Act.' Traditionally, federal courts have borrowed the statute of limita-
1. The controversy about the appropriate limitations period is reflected in the case law,
compare In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988); Norris v. Wirtz, 818
F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987) with Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders,
Lockerman & Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1986). In the academic commentary; compare
Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5 Claims: A Study in Judicial Lassi-
tude, 60 U. CoLo. L. REV. 235 (1989); Garrett, The Ramshackle Edifice: Limitations Periods for
Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1989); Sobol, Determining Limitations
Periods for Actions Arising Under Federal Statutes, 41 Sw. L.J. 895 (1987), with Special Pro-
ject, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State
Statutes of Limitation, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011 (1980) [hereinafter Special Project].
This issue arises in the context of claims brought under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 that was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") to augment the statutory proscriptions. Section 10(b) states:
Sec. 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national security exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors. 15 U.S.C. § 780)(b) (1982).
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
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tions from the most analogous state statute when required to fix a limita-
tions period in a private action under Rule 10b-5.2 Recently, however, three
circuit courts of appeal deserted the time honored state borrowing doctrine,
and applied a federal statutory limitations period.'
The controversy about the derivation of a time bar in Rule 10b-5 litiga-
tion is a reflection of the broader issue of determining the correct limitations
period for actions arising under federal statutes. In several recent decisions,
the United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of implying a stat-
ute of limitations for federal causes of action.' These decisions have created
an analytic framework for borrowing the most appropriate limitations pe-
rod when federal causes of action lack an express limitations period. Lower
federal courts, however, have not uniformly resolved the issue of the appro-
priate limitations period in Rule 10b-5 cases. This lack of uniformity has
created greater uncertainty concerning the applicable statute of limitations.'
Although the precise issue of implying an appropriate statute of limita-
tions in Rule 10b-5 cases has eluded definitive resolution by the Supreme
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
At an early point in the development of the regulatory proscription, the federal courts
implied a private right of action for violations of Rule 10b-5. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court formally recognized the implied cause of
action in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1970). Since 1970,
the Court has addressed several substantive, procedural, and remedial issues concerning the
scope of the implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). These recent cases limited the scope of the
implied right of action, but the action is still used extensively to remedy fraudulent conduct in
connection with securities transactions. See T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION, §
13.2, at 666-67 (2d ed. 1990). For a recent discussion of the history of section 10(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act, see Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Durham v. Business Management Assoc., 847 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1988);
Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1986); Friedlander v. Troutman,
Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1986). See generally, T. HAZEN,
supra note 1, § 13.8, at 722-23.
3. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990); Short v. Belleville Shoe
Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d
Cir. 1988) (en banc).
4. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151
(1983).
5. See supra note 3.
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Court, this Article argues the Court's recent decisions do provide a general,
but workable, framework for determining an appropriate limitations period
in these cases. The recent Supreme Court cases identify the public policy
principles and judicial processes involved in the determination of the appro-
priate statute of limitations for federal actions. A review of these principles
and processes, in the context of the Supreme Court's rulings, demonstrates
an analytic method of defining the appropriate limitations period for Rule
10b-5 lawsuits.
This Article contends the policy considerations previously defined by
the Court can be crafted into a principled analysis for defining the appropri-
ate statute of limitations in Rule 10b-5 actions. The first part of the Article
considers the role of courts in performing essentially legislative activities by
fashioning statutes of limitations when Congress has failed to do so. This
judicial role is often difficult because courts generally lack the legislative
experience and authority to perform interstitial lawmaking functions. These
judicial difficulties require that courts attempt to make decisions by emulat-
ing legislative decisionmaking in articulating bright line repose and limita-
tions rules. In addition, however, the current implication analysis requires
the application of judicial skills, such as claim characterization and reason-
ing by analogy, which judges customarily perform.
The second part of this Article describes the law of judicial implication
of statutes of limitations, including the state borrowing or absorption doc-
trine and a trio of recent Supreme Court decisions which articulate the cur-
rent implication analysis. This part concludes with an identification of the
policy considerations that shape judicial consideration of interstitial law-
making responsibilities. The third part of this Article applies these princi-
ples to claims under Rule 10b-5 and critiques several recent lower court
cases adapting a uniform federal rule to supply a limitations period in Rule
10b-5 cases. This part concludes with a recommendation that a single state
statute be borrowed to supply the statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5
claims.
II. INTERSTITIAL LAWMAKING: THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
PERIODS FOR FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION
This section considers the appropriate role of courts in fashioning statu-
tory limitations periods when Congress has failed to expressly provide for a
time bar. In the absence of a statutory limitations period, the courts are
asked to imply one. This function, which is essentially legislative, presents
the difficult questions of judicial competency and authority.
6. The legislative nature of the task involved in selecting a statute of limitations when
Congress has failed to do so has been noticed by several federal judges. Judge Friendly once
commented that the "selection of a period of years [is] not ... the kind of thing judges do."
Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961). Judge Richard Posner
[Vol. 40
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The problem of interstitial lawmaking arises in a couple contexts. First,
the problem arises when Congress expressly provides a private right of ac-
tion but fails to expressly provide a statute of limitations to govern that
right of action.7 In this situation, there is often legislative history regarding
the importance of the private right of action in achieving the policies of the
federal statutory scheme. Certainly, it is possible to reach an understanding
about the importance of the federal policy underlying the statute from the
mere fact that Congress permits private parties to vindicate those policy
interests, even though Congress fails to fill in the detail of a limitations
period.
A more troublesome problem arises when courts imply a private right of
action and then are required to imply a statute of limitations to govern ac-
tions brought under the implied cause of action.8 Implication of a statute of
limitations for an implied cause of action is, in many respects, more difficult
for courts than implying a statute of limitations for an expressly created
cause of action. It is more difficult because there is often no legislative indi-
cation of the importance of the substantive rights created by the statute
from which the private right of action is implied.9 Further, there is often no
discussed the arbitrary nature of the judicial decision to select a limitations period and indi-
cated that making arbitrary decisions was "a legislative rather than a judicial task." Short v.
Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d at 1394 (Posner, J., concurring). He continued:
Legislators can be as arbitrary as they please within the broad limits set by the Con-
stitution but judges are supposed to reason to their conclusions, and how can you
reason to 3 years over 2, 300 days over 240, 20 years over 15? You cannot; but neither
can you reason to the right statute of limitations to borrow.
Id. (emphasis in original).
7. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
The Court in Agency Holding Corp. was required to imply a statute of limitations period for
private actions under the Racketeering Influence Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"). Al-
though Congress had expressly provided a private right of action for persons injured by reason
of racketeering activity, Congress had failed to provide a statute of limitations to govern RICO
actions. Id. at 146.
8. This problem is presented, for example, in actions brought under a variety of federal
statutes, including the federal securities laws. See Comment, The Parameters of Federal Com-
mon Law: The Case of Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1447
(1988); Sobol, supra note 1. The problems of legislative interpretation may be exacerbated in
actions under Rule 10b-5. The private right of action was implied from a regulation, and there
is little agency history concerning the creation of the rule and, of course, there is no legislative
history about the purpose or objectives of the rule that the SEC was to promulgate pursuant to
the powers of section 10(b). For some history on Rule 10b-5, see Exchange Act Release No. 34-
3230 (May 21, 1942)("The new rule closes a loophole in the protections against fraud adminis-
tered by the commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they
engage in fraud in their purchase.").
9. The process of judicial implication of a right of action, when Congress has failed to
provide an express cause of action, requires an examination for "any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 78 (1975). In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, the Court described the in-
strumental significance of congressional intent to the process of implying a private right of
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legislative history explaining the practical implications of a cause of action
for violation of the statutory provisions.
The judicial function in creating an appropriate limitations period is
essentially the same whether Congress has created an express right of action
or the court has implied a private right of action."0 However, the judicial
role in determining an appropriate statute of limitations is difficult because
it requires skills normally exercised by legislators and is based on authority
usually reposed in Congress.1 The role of judges, then, is to determine how
Congress would act had it considered the issue of an appropriate limitations
period. 2 This hypothetical lawmaking session, which judges are forced to
perform when considering an appropriate limitations period, is difficult for
several reasons.
First, a determination of the statute of limitations requires certain pol-
icy-making skills which are normally considered to be possessed by legisla-
tors."3 A statute of limitations is a legislative manifestation of the policy of
repose; that is, at some point a wrongdoer's exposure to liability for his or
her wrongdoing should end and the wrongdoer should be permitted to con-
tinue his or her life without fear of retribution. This decision reflects com-
action under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act:
The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by impli-
cation, is basically a matter of statutory construction. While some opinions of the
Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of implying private
rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a
given statute, what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to
create the private remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear. We ac-
cept this as the appropriate inquiry to be made in resolving the issues presented by
the case before us.
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) (citations omitted).
10. One judge has remarked that when Congress has failed to provide a limitation period,
judges bear a greater responsibility for fashioning an appropriate limitations period when they
create a private right of action. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d at 1387 (7th Cir.
1990)("Federal courts have an obligation to create stable periods of limitations for their
handiwork.").
11. One commentator suggested these interstices may be viewed as flaws occurring in the
legislative process or as an inevitable consequence of legislating in a complex society. Comment,
The Parameters of Federal Common Law: The Case of Time Limitations on Federal Causes of
Action, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (1988). However, irrespective of the reason for the legisla-
tive interstices, the federal courts have been perceived as an appropriate instrument to fill the
gaps. See U.S. v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)("[Tihe inevitable in-
completeness presented by all legislation means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic
responsibility of the federal courts.").
12. This form of statutory interpretation, which has been referred to as "imaginative re-
construction," requires a judge to place himself "in the shoes of the enacting legislators and
figure out how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case before him." R. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-87 (1985). The judge must study the language,
history, and structure of the statute in question and must consider the historical context in
which the statute was passed. Id. at 287.
13. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d at 1394 (Posner, J., concurring).
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munal values about culpability and retribution, and it is argued that a more
representative institution should decide the weight of these values in the
decision about length of exposure.
Second, a statute of limitations also reflects legislative policy concerning
the nature of the conduct addressed by the underlying private right of ac-
tion. A statutory limit reflects the congressional policy about the efficacy of
the private right of action in achieving statutory objectives (e.g., compensa-
tory, remedial, or deterrence objectives). The courts have found the most
appropriate limitations period among a menu of possible choices. The menu
has been defined by judicial reference to analogous statutory schemes. The
courts have solved the problem of legislative intersticies by applying the
skills of claim characterization and reasoning by analogy to the task.'"
III. TYPOLOGY OF IMPLICATION ANALYSIS
A. In General
Courts faced with the issue of implying an appropriate statute of limita-
tions for a federal cause of action have traditionally borrowed the state stat-
ute of limitations most analogous to the federal cause of action.'" This anal-
ysis requires the federal judge to take several steps. First, the court must
decide that no statute of limitations under federal law expressly applies to
the federal cause of action.' 6 Second, the court must characterize the federal
cause of action to determine the nature and type of federal interest in-
volved.' 7 Third, the court must locate a state statute of limitations that gov-
erns state causes of action or claims for relief most analogous to the charac-
terized federal cause of action.'8
This implication analysis has presented several difficulties for courts in
determining the most appropriate limitations policy. Courts must consider
whether a state statute of limitations must be reviewed exclusively to deter-
mine an appropriate statute of limitations for a federal cause of action. This
requires consideration of the borrowing doctrine in its historical context.
Second, courts must consider whether the characterization process proceeds
as a matter of federal or state law. Finally, courts must determine whether
to create a federal statute of limitations for a federal cause of action when
there is no analogous state cause of action.
The complexities of the implication analysis are, in large part, attribu-
table to the origin of the borrowing doctrine and to some surprising turns in
the course of judicial treatment of the doctrine. The next section explores
these complexities in the context of the state borrowing doctrine.
14. See infra notes 103-09 & accompanying text.
15. See generally, Special Project, supra note 1, at 1012-13.
16. Sobol, supra note 1, at 899.
17. Id.
18. Garrett, supra note 1, at 5-11.
1991]
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B. The Context of the State Borrowing Doctrine
The state borrowing doctrine and the circumstances in which state law
is absorbed into federal law for purposes of determining the appropriate
statute of limitations for a federal cause of action are examined in this sec-
tion. The analysis necessarily begins with McCluny v. Silliman,19 and the
Federal Rules of Decision Act.2 0 In McCluny a purchaser of public lands
sued a federal land office registrar after the officer refused to enter a land
purchase application.2 ' The lower federal court held that a state statute of
limitations for actions -on the case barred the plaintiffs action, and the
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.22 The plaintiff argued that state
statutes of limitations may now be pled in federal courts when the plaintiff
possessed a federal cause of action.22 The Supreme Court held the Rules of
Decision Act required "the acts of limitations of the several states, where no
special provision has been made by Congress, form a rule of decision in the
Courts of the United States, and the same effect is given to them as is given
in the State Courts. 2 The Court held that because the state statute encom-
passed all actions on the case, including actions brought against federal of-
ficers for failure to act pursuant to federal law, the action was barred.25
The Court's analysis in McCluny is problematic because it does not ap-
pear that the Rules of Decision Act was intended to apply to federal causes
of action.2 6 Indeed, the Court in McCluny assumed that the Rules of Deci-
sion Act required the absorption of state limitations into federal law, and
never considered other alternatives.27
The Court's reasoning in McCluny was extended in Campbell v. Haver-
hill.2 s Campbell involved a patent infringement action brought in federal
court, which had exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. The lower court
held that a state statute of limitations barred the action for patent infringe-
19. McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). The Rules of Decision Act provides that "[t]he laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or Treaties of the United States or Acts of Con-
gress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id.
The Act, which was passed in 1789, originally contained language that was substantially
similar to its modern version. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923).
21. McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. at 270-71.
22. Id. at 276.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 277.
25. Id. at 278-79.
26. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1026 n.79.
27. Id. at 1027-28. Among the choices available to the McCluny Court were the creation
of a federal statute of limitations applicable to malfeasance actions against federal officers, ap-
plication of the laches doctrine finding of no applicable limitations period at all, and selection
of an analogous federal statute. Id.
28. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
[Vol. 40
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ment. 9 The Supreme Court affirmed and held the Rules of Decision Act
required the application of a state time bar.30 Thus, the Campbell Court
read the Rules of Decision Act to apply in all cases, even those in which the
federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over a federal claim, except when
Congress had expressly provided a limitations period to the federal right
involved.-" However, the Campbell Court also held the absorption require-
ment could be waived if the limitations period borrowed from state law un-
duly burdened or discriminated against a federal right.32
For many years, the Supreme Court continued to mechanically apply its
decision in the McCluny case. The Rules of Decision Act was routinely ap-
plied to a variety of federal causes of action without any thoughtful review
or reconsideration of its appropriateness.3 3 The Court was mistaken in its
decision that the Rules of Decision Act required application of the state
statute of limitations in all actions for which Congress had not expressly
provided a cause of action.3 ' It seems clear that the Rules of Decision Act
was not meant to apply to federal causes of action, particularly those in
which the Court's jurisdiction was exclusive. Moreover, it appears that the
Rules of Decision Act required federal courts to apply state limitation rules
with discretion in cases involving state causes of action.
The state borrowing doctrine was re-evaluated in Holmberg v. Arm-
brecht.39 In that case, creditors sued the shareholders of a bank under the
Federal Farm Loan Act."' The suit occurred ten years after the plaintiffs
learned that a bank shareholder had concealed his stock ownership.3 7 The
district court rejected the shareholder's assertion that the state statute of
limitations and the doctrine of laches barred the action. 8 The court of ap-
peals disagreed and held the state statute of limitations must be applied."
The Supreme Court, in a decision authored by Justice Frankfurter, reversed
the court of appeals and held that prior Supreme Court precedent did not
require the application of state law.40 The Court then considered what law it
should choose in fashioning an appropriate statute of limitations. The Court
29. Id. at 611.
30. Id. at 614.
31. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1032.
32. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. at 614-16.
33. See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390
(1906)(applying a state statute of limitations to a federal antitrust action and holding the state
period applied because the "matter [had been] left to the local law by the silence of the Stat-
utes of the United States."); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 321 (1914) (Civil Rights Act);
McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905) (National Bank Act).
34. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1037.
35. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
36. Id. at 393.
37. Id.
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pointed out that Congress had "usually left the limitation of time for com-
mencing actions under national legislation to judicial implications" and that
congressional silence had been "interpreted to mean that it is federal policy
to adopt the local law of limitation."' 1 The Court held:
The implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the intersti-
ces of federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where
Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial determination
within the general framework of familiar legal principles.42
Thus, the Holmberg Court rejected the conclusion that the Rules of De-
cision Act compelled application of state statutes of limitations in litigation
involving federally created rights of action. This conclusion permitted the
federal courts, in the absence of an express statutory time bar, to choose
state law. 3 This shift in judicial thinking created the possibility that federal
limitation statutes may apply to federal causes of action which had no appli-
cable time bar. More fundamentally, the Court indicated that interstitial,
judicial lawmaking should proceed according to a "general framework of fa-
miliar legal principles.""1
4
After the Holmberg decision, the federal courts continued to absorb
state time bars and apply them to litigation involving federal causes of ac-
tion. Federal courts, however, have refused to adopt state periods under two
circumstances: (1) when the state statute would impermissibly undermine a
federal right, or (2) when the state statute would discriminate against the
federal right by providing a longer limitations period for an analogous state
41. Id. at 395. The depth of this assertion, that congressional silence on the limitations
issue implies an intention to incorporate state law, is uncertain in the case law. After the Holm-
berg case freed the federal courts from any mandatory requirement that state law be applied,
the courts continued to routinely apply the state limitations period. See Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 529-30 (1954); Special Project, supra
note 1, at 1043. This practice of preferring state law is a product of judicial interpretation of
legislative intent. For example, if Congress, at the time it passed a substantive provision, knew
that absent limitation periods were supplied from state law, the legislative intent was to incor-
porate state limitations periods. More recently, in DelCostello, the Court stated "the general
preference for borrowing state limitations periods could more aptly be called a sort of fallback
rule of thumb than a matter of ascertaining legislative intent; it rests on the assumption that,
absent some sound reason to do otherwise, Congress would likely intend that the courts follow
their previous practice of borrowing state provisions." DelCostello v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-59 n.12 (1983).
42. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 395.
43. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1041-42.
44. The Holmberg Court did not define either the nature or the process of the "general
framework," nor did the Court precisely describe the "familiar legal principles." However, the
Court's opinion makes it clear the Court meant that it was federal policy to adopt the local law
of limitation when Congress has failed to provide a time limit, and all general rules of equity
should be incorporated into the process of deciding the appropriate limitations period. Holm-
berg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 394-97.
[Vol. 40
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cause of action." The cases interpreting these exceptions from the state ab-
sorption doctrine involve somewhat unusual circumstances in which federal
interests represented by the substantive federal law are subordinated to, or
discriminated against by, state law. For example, in Occidental Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission," the lower court
applied a California statute governing tort actions to bar a claim by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that Occidental had engaged
in discriminatory employment practices violating Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 4' The Supreme Court held the one-year state statute of
limitations applied by the lower court directly conflicted with the time table
for administrative action in the federal act; therefore, the importation of
state law would frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national
policy."s
Similarly, the courts have refused to apply state limitations periods
which impermissibly discriminate against a federal cause of action.4' For ex-
ample, when state law expressly provides a statute of limitations for federal
law, and that bar is shorter than the time bar for an analogous state right of
action, the courts have routinely refused to apply the state limitations pe-
riod created expressly for the federal right of action. 0 These exemptions
from the general rule favoring absorption of state statutes of limitations are
based on the supremacy clause. 1 Federal courts will refuse to apply a state
limitations period when the period is so short that it burdens the assertion
of federal rights and when the state statute impermissibly discriminates
against federal rights in the absence of a compelling state policy.2
Aside from the general presumption favoring the absorption of state
limitations periods, there has been a correlative hesitancy on the part of the
courts to create uniform federal rules. For example, in UA W v. Hoosier Car-
45. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1045.
46. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
47. See EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
rev'd, 535 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
48. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. at 367-69.
49. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1045; Sobol, supra note 1, at 902-03.
50. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbldg. Co., 161 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1947)
(one-year state statute of limitations intended to govern actions brought under Fair Labor
Standards Act not applied when an analogous three-year state period was provided for claims
on implied employment contracts and a six year limitation period for claims under an express
employment contract); Van Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Virginia stat-
ute that barred civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought more than one year after
they accrued was not applied because Virginia had a two-year period for personal injury
actions).
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In its truest sense, the effect of the supremacy clause is to
pre-empt state laws that interfere with federal interests. See Special Project, supra note 1, at
1045-46 n.148.
52. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1054.
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dinal Corp.5" the Court refused to create a federal limitations period for
claims arising under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.54
Notwithstanding the widespread inconsistency among federal courts in
choosing an appropriate limitations period for claims under the Act, the
Court considered the creation of a uniform federal period of limitation as a
"bald . . . form of judicial innovation." ' The Court acknowledged the im-
portance of uniform federal labor laws but held the need for uniformity is
important only when its "absence [threatens] the smooth functioning of
[the] consensual processes" that underlie congressionally created federal la-
bor law."
The implication analysis designed by the Supreme Court in the early
period was premised on two essential principles. First, state law should pre-
sumptively be applied to imply a statute of limitations for federal actions
lacking an express limitations period. Second, state law should be borrowed
unless its adoption or application flatly conflicts with the federal policy un-
derlying the substantive federal right of action. These general principles fa-
cilitated the implication process and provided bright line rules for federal
judges searching for an appropriate limitations period. However, interest in
federal limitations periods was growing, and litigants increasingly advocated
the use of these federal statutes of repose. 57
C. Recent Supreme Court Cases on Borrowing Periods
The Supreme Court, in several cases decided since 1982, has reformu-
lated an analytic format for implying a statute of limitations for federal
causes of action."' These cases articulate a thoughtful framework for borrow-
ing an appropriate limitations period when Congress has failed to articulate
one. These cases also reflect a more comprehensive analysis for implying a
statute of limitations than prior case law. This section discusses those cases
and identifies the critical analytic considerations for implying a statute of
limitations.
In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,59 the Court
held federal statutory law can serve as a source for a borrowed limitations
period."' The case involved a "hybrid" suit under section 301 of the Labor
53. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
54. Id. at 703.
55. Id. at 701.
56. Id. at 702.
57. A significant factor in the increased interest of federal statutes as the source of an
implied limitations period is the growth of federal statutory law and the greater number of
federal statutes that could be used as analogues. See Note, A Functional Approach to Borrow-
ing Limitations Periods for Federal Statutes, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 133, 148 (1989).
58. See supra note 2.
59. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
60. Id. at 171-72.
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Management Relations Act and the union's duty of fair representation.'
The claim against the employer was based on section 301, which does not
have an express limitations bar, and the claim against the union was implied
under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act.2 The Court, noting
that neither claim was covered by an express federal limitations period, held
the six month limitations bar for filing unfair labor practice complaints
should be borrowed and applied to both claims.68 The Court departed from
its reasoning in previous borrowing cases and held that courts could imply a
federal statute of limitations when a state limitations period conflicts with
federal policy as well as when the state statute is less attractive than a fed-
eral statute. " The DelCostello Court held that federal courts searching for
an appropriate limitations period should initially resort to state law, and
federal law may be applied only when a federal rule "clearly provides a
closer analogy than available state statutes," and the "federal policies at
stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more
appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."' 6
The analysis of the plaintiff's claims proved interesting. The Court re-
jected possible analogies to state law because there were no close parallels
for hybrid actions in state law."' The Court, however, did find the limita-
tions period in section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act was supe-
rior to any state statute of limitations because it governed similar underly-
ing conduct, represented a congressional balancing of similar interests, and
promoted national uniformity in federal labor law. 7 The Court balanced the
strong federal policy in favor of prompt resolution of labor disputes and the
relative unsophistication of plaintiffs in hybrid actions."
In Wilson v. Garcia,9 the Court again departed from a long-established
61. Id. at 154. The plaintiff in DelCostello had lost his job because he refused to operate
allegedly unsafe equipment. Id. at 155. His union unsuccessfully maintained a formal grievance
against the employer. Id. The plaintiff sued the employer for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement and the union for breach of its fair representation duties. Id. at 155-56.
62. Id. at 164 n.14.
63. Id. at 155.
64. Note, supra note 57, at 143.
65. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. at 171-72. The Court did not
identify any generally applicable "federal policies at stake" or "practicalities of litigation." Id.
However, the Court's opinion did identify several relevant considerations in the context of the
plaintiff's claims for relief. Id. at 166-68. The Court discussed the policies of the underlying
federal claims to permit an aggrieved employee to vindicate his statutory rights in a reasonable
period of time and to collect damages against an employer. Id. Finally, the DelCostello Court
referred to the duty of the courts in fashioning a federal law of collective bargaining to ensure
that " 'the law reflect the realities of industrial life and the nature of the collective bargaining
process.'" Id. at 172 (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 358 (1964)(Goldberg, J.,
concurring)).
66. Id. at 165.
67. Id. at 170-71.
68. Id. at 165-66.
69. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
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rule and held that all section 1983 civil rights claims should be characterized
as tort claims, and the state statute of limitations for torts should be bor-
rowed.7 The Court found a problem associated with the state borrowing
doctrine arises when a federal cause of action can be brought for a variety of
different types of claims. 1 According to the Court, it might be possible for
courts to recognize multiple statutes of limitations for section 1983 claims
within the same state and even within the same case. 2 The Court failed to
examine any federal limitations periods to determine whether they might
serve as a more appropriate limitations period for section 1983 actions.7
Rather, it stated that "the settled practice has been to adopt a local time
limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to
do so."" The Court did, however, stress the unacceptability of multiple limi-
tations periods for the same federal cause of action.7' The Court emphasized
the federal interests in "uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of un-
necessary litigation" and concluded these considerations require the use of a
single characterization for all claims under the same statute.76
Later, in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.,7 7 the
Court was required to derive an appropriate limitations period for private
actions brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act ("RICO").78 The Court examined federal law to find an appropriate
analogy and found the Clayton Act was approximately analogous to RICO.7 9
According to the Court, the remedial and standing to sue provisions of
RICO were patterned after section 4 of the Clayton Act. 0 The Court also
noted there was no "comparable single state law analogue to RICO," and the
substantial federal interests implicated by the use of interstate commerce to
commit RICO offenses counseled the use of a federal statutory norm.81 The
70. Id. at 276.
71. Id. at 272-74.
72. Id. at 274.
73. Id. at 266.
74. Id. at 266-67.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 275. The Wilson Court, however, failed to develop the importance of its concern
about "uniformity, certainty and minimization of unnecessary litigation." Id. The Court again
conducted a "practical inquiry" into the most appropriate statute of limitations to be borrowed
in Owens v. Lessard, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). Id. at 272. The Court expressed concern about the
lack of predictability when courts attempted to determine whether a personal injury limitations
period of a forum state should be applied to all section 1983 claims or whether the statute of
limitations for intentional torts should be applied. Id. at 272-74. According to the Court, con-
cerns about predictability required that the limitations period for personal injury torts should
be selected as the most appropriate time bar. Id. at 275.
77. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
78. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
79. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. at 150-53.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 152.
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Court, however, reiterated its admonition that state law should be rejected
as the appropriate borrowed limitations period only "in limited circum-
stances" and when it conflicts with federal policy.
8 2
The recent Supreme Court cases depart from the earlier line of cases by
setting a different tone and a more comprehensive type of analysis for im-
plying a limitations period. Some of the policy considerations of the earlier
cases were retained in the modern analysis. The Court, however, built upon
the early absorption doctrine in several important respects.
The new implication analysis articulated by the Court appears to be a
type of legislative analysis which considers a number of policy considera-
tions in making a decision. It represents the Court's articulation of a more
comprehensive framework of general legal principles that must be consid-
ered in borrowing the most appropriate time bar in federal actions. While
the early type of implication analysis was relatively simplistic, the new anal-
ysis requires an examination and balancing of several factors in determining
the most appropriate limitations period to borrow. The next section sets
forth a description of the policy considerations involved in the new implica-
tion analysis.
D. A Synthesis of Policy Considerations in Conducting an Implication
Analysis
The cases decided by the Court in recent years provide a framework for
analyzing the implication of a time bar in federal statutory cases. More spe-
cifically, they provide a means for designing an appropriate limitations pol-
icy concerning private actions under Rule 10b-5. This framework is imple-
mented by balancing several policy considerations or principles that permit
a judicial decision on the most appropriate limitations period.
1. The Policy of Repose
The courts have commonly held that a limitations period may be bor-
rowed. Occasionally courts and commentators have concluded that perhaps
no statute of limitations period should be borrowed because Congress failed
to provide one. s The courts have wisely rejected this path. 4
82. Id. at 147-48.
83. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240-44 (1985). In
Oneida Indian Nation, Indian tribes sued two New York counties alleging a right to recover on
void land conveyances made by their ancestors in 1795. Id. at 229. The conveyances allegedly
violated the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793, which contained no express time limit.
Id. The Court found the state limitation was inconsistent with the general federal policy
against limitations on land claims by Indians. Id. at 239-44. Rather than searching for another
source for a limitations period, the Court held that no limitation period should apply to the
Indians' action. Id.; see generally, Sobol, supra note 1, at 912.
Justice Scalia returns to this perspective in his concurring opinion in Agency Holding Co.
v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. at 163-64. He promotes the use of a preemption analy-
1991]
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The legal concept of repose reflects important communal values in soci-
ety and the belief that interstitial judicial lawmaking should reflect those
values.8 5 In addition, the concept of repose reflects strong efficiency charac-
teristics. A limitations period encourages defendants to pursue worthwhile
activities without fear of litigation for past transactions and encourages po-
tential plaintiffs to promptly vindicate their perceived wrongs."' Further, in-
stitutional concerns of courts are advanced by a borrowing policy that mea-
sures repose because courts may be run more efficiently when evidence of
wrongdoing is fresh, rather than stale, and when the memories of parties are
still clear.S7
2. Federalism
The relationship of federal policy to state law is a delicate one. This
consideration has influenced the Supreme Court in its articulation of the
rule that state law should be consulted first to determine an appropriate
limitations period. In the Malley-Duff case, for example, the Court pointed
out that the federal policy underlying the RICO private action was suffi-
ciently great to override the presumption in favor of state limitations
periods. s8
sis to the state borrowing doctrine. Id. According to Justice Scalia, absent a federal time bar,
courts must determine which "state statute of limitations applies to the federal claim as a
matter of state law" and then determine "whether the federal statute creating the cause of
action pre-empts the state limitations period." Id. at 163. With respect to the second inquiry,
Justice Scalia states that if a court determines the state limitations period is inconsistent with
the federal statute, then the state statute is preempted and "that is the end of the matter, and
there is no limitation on the federal cause of action." Id. at 164.
84. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983). The DelCos-
tello Court held that when Congress fails to provide an expressed statute of limitations, courts
do not find that no time limitations should be recognized. See generally id. Further, in Wilson
v. Garcia, the Court held that an absence of limitations period is repugnant to the "genius of
our laws." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985). The Wilson Court stated the borrowing
doctrine serves the policies of repose because it "incorporates the States' judgment of the
proper balance between the policies of repose and the substantive policies of enforcement em-
bodied in the state cause of action." Id.
85. See Sobol, supra note 1, at 897-99. The author contends limitations or repose periods
serve to protect three groups: potential defendants, courts, and society in general. Id. These
communal values include providing fairness to potential defendants by predictably defining the
extent of exposure to suit. Id. at 898. This allows potential defendants to conduct their business
without fear of having to defend themselves in suits alleging stale claims. Id. Repose also pro-
tects society by preserving stability in commercial and business relations and protecting bona
fide purchasers of property who can assure themselves that stale claims may not be asserted
against their property. Id; see also Special Project, supra note 1, at 1016-20.
86. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 1018 (arguing that one purpose of a period of
repose is to encourage plaintiffs to bring their action quickly); see also Sobol, supra note 1, at
897-98.
87. Sobol, supra note 1, at 898.
88. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
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There are two principal inquiries with respect to the issue of federal-
state relations in determining an appropriate statute of limitations: (1) in-
quiry into the issue of the primacy of state law, and (2) inquiry into the
issue of quantifying the conflict between state limitations and federal law
and policy. The first issue considers the appropriate role of state law in de-
termining the best statute of limitations and asks whether state time bars
are just one possible source or presumptively the most appropriate source
for borrowing. 9 The Supreme Court's recent holdings, as discussed in the
preceding section, are unclear on the extent to which there is a presumption
that state law should be borrowed. In some cases, the Court held that the
state limitations period is presumptively appropriate and that the presump-
tion may be dispelled by a showing of discriminatory impact on federal
law." Other cases, such as DelCostello, suggest the state period should be
borrowed unless it is less attractive than a federal period.9
The appropriate resolution to this substantive and procedural issue ap-
pears in Holmberg. State law must be preferred over federal law in implying
a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action because of the Rules of
Decision Act and because it reflects the experiences of states in determining
policies of repose.2 The preference for state law provides a useful rule of
thumb when conflicts arise over the most appropriate limitations period (as
between a state and a federal statute), and, when there are no competing
89. This inquiry forms the most significant issue in the process of implication. The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held that legislative omission of a limitations period should pre-
sumptively require borrowing of a state limitations period. See Occidential Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977)(Title VII action); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179-82
(1976)(Civil Rights Act of 1866); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-
05(1966)(section 301 of Labor Management Relations Act).
90. See, e.g., Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261 (1985).
91. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-72 (1983). The
DelCostello Court, however, pointed out that it's refusal to apply a state limitations period did
not signal a turn away from the presumption that state law would be borrowed:
We stress that our holding today should not be taken as a departure from prior prac-
tice in borrowing limitations periods for federal causes of action, in labor law or else-
where. We do not mean to suggest that federal courts should eschew use of state
limitations periods anytime state law fails to provide a perfect analogy. On the con-
trary, as the courts have often discovered, there is not always an obvious state-law
choice for application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to state law re-
mains the norm for borrowing of limitations periods. Nevertheless, when a rule from
elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state stat-
utes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make
that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have
not hesitated to turn away from state law.
Id. at 171-72 (citations omitted).
92. "Three pragmatic justifications support the presumption to absorb state limitations
periods. The practice (1) promotes local experimentation; (2) avoids undermining the substan-
tive policies of the states; and (3) eliminates the difficult task of analyzing the implications of
each new rule in all fifty states." Special Project, supra note 1, at 1043.
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statutes of limitation, the preference permits a considered legislative judg-
ment on an appropriate repose period to be supplied.93
Another federalism issue arises when a court considers both state and
federal limitations periods. In some circumstances, a state limitations period
may discriminate against the substantive policy of the federal statute, and,
as the Court has repeatedly held, the state policy must be subordinated to
the federal policy. 4 In a comprehensive consideration of the policies in-
volved, this may indicate the unsuitability of the state law. It does not, how-
ever, necessarily prove the suitability of the federal limit against which the
state rule is tested.
3. Institutional Deference
The courts have expressed concern about the ability of federal judges to
create a federal rule of limitations when Congress has failed to act. This
deference has been manifested in some rules governing interstitial lawmak-
ing by judges. These rules may govern the form or procedure for resolving
the issue of borrowing the most appropriate limitations period.
One rule, articulated in Holmberg, is that state limits should be pre-
ferred when borrowing a limitations period.9 As previously discussed, the
Court's recent position on this rule is unclear, but the preferred reading is
that state limitations periods should be considered first in determining the
most appropriate limitations period.96
Another rule is that Congress' intent in passing the federal statute
93. In DelCostello, the Court stated that:
In some instances, of course, there may be some direct indication in the legislative
history suggesting that Congress did in fact intend that state statutes should apply.
More often, however, Congress has not given any express consideration to the prob-
lem of limitations periods. In such cases, the general preference for borrowing state
limitations periods could more aptly be called a sort of fallback rule of thumb than a
matter of ascertaining legislative intent; it rests on the assumption that, absent some
sound reason to do otherwise, Congress would likely intend that the courts follow
their previous practice of borrowing state provisions.
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. at 158 n.12.
Others have argued a presumptive absorption of state statutes of limitation serves the im-
portant purposes of relieving judges of making the very arbitrary decision on an appropriate
limitations period because the decision is better left to the legislatures. Special Project, supra
note 1, at 1044. Because the values served by definite periods of repose are important to courts,
litigants, and society, the collective wisdom of a deliberative decision-making body may legiti-
mate the decision in a way that courts simply cannot.
94. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1045-55. The authors contend that "[flederal courts
have refused to adopt state periods if (1) the state statute would provide an unduly short limi-
tations period that would impermissibly undermine a federal right, or (2) the state statute
would discriminate against a federal right by providing a longer limitations period for an analo-
gous state right." Id. (citing Van Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384, 389-91 (E.D. Va. 1975)).
95. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394-97 (1946).
96. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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should be determined by a court addressing the time bar issue."7 This factor
presents difficulty for some courts because the federal policies underlying
the statute may not be obvious or discernable from legislative history or any
other source. Courts may also find it difficult to correlate different limitation
periods and still accomplish statutory objectives."
4. Uniformity
It is generally believed that uniformity of rules makes for greater pre-
dictability in the application of those rules and, therefore, the courts should
strive for uniformity of limitations periods.9 For example, in Wilson v. Gar-
cia, the Court held the state tort statute of limitations should be implied for
claims arising under section 1983.100 Later, in Owens v. Okure,101 the Court
held the interest of uniformity of application required that when state law
provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts
in section 1983 cases should borrow the general or residual statute for per-
97. The Supreme Court has suggested the need to consider the policy underlying the sub-
stantive federal statute in a couple of contexts, but has not stated with any precision the role of
substantive federal policy in the implication analysis. In DelCostello, the Court held state law
must first be consulted for an appropriate statute to borrow, but a federal time limit may be
borrowed when it "clearly provides a closer analogy" and "when the federal policies at stake
and the practicalities of litigation make that [federal] rule a significantly more appropriate
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. at
171-72. Similarly, federal policy is important in determining whether the application of a un-
duly short state limitations period would thwart the remedial policy of the federal right of
action. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154-55 (1987) (citing
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. at 166-68).
98. For example, it may be difficult for a court to determine the policies underlying a
federal statute or implied right of action are advanced by a three-year limitations period, but
not a four or five-year limitations period. See supra note 6. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court in DelCostello reasoned the state limitations periods that were raised as candidates for
borrowing were unsatisfactory because they were too short in length to properly accommodate
the remedial and compensatory objectives of the federal labor laws in question. DelCostello v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. at 166-68.
99. The most frequently encountered argument is that a lack of uniformity permits incon-
sistent decisions by federal courts. Sobol, supra note 1, at 905-06. In the context of implying a
limitations period in Rule 10b-5 cases, the commentary argues the practicalities of litigation
require a uniform time bar and a uniform rule would prevent time consuming litigation over
the borrowing issue, encourage private enforcement of the securities law, provide greater cer-
tainty for defendants, and prevent forum shopping by plaintiffs. Garrett, supra note 1, at 18-
22.
100. See generally Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
101. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). The Court was asked to consider the most
analogous state statute of limitations to be applied in a section 1983 case when the state had
both a general or residual limitations statute for personal injury claims and a statute of limita-
tions for intentional torts. Id. The Court conducted what it terms a "practical inquiry" to de-
termine "the appropriate personal injury limitations statute that can be applied with ease and
predictability in all 50 States." Id.
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A significant difference exists between the intrastate uniformity issue
decided in Wilson v. Garcia, and the argument that a national uniform fed-
eral rule should be applied to supply an absent limitations period. Requiring
the use of only one state limitations period when several competing periods
might be applicable is not inconsistent with the state borrowing doctrine
and limits the uncertainty of a claim-by-claim approach to implying time
bars.1 0 3 On the other hand, the selection of a national uniform limitations
period rejects the state borrowing doctrine. The Supreme Court has held
that use of a uniform national rule is appropriate only when the absence of
such a rule threatens "the smooth functioning of [the] consensual processes"
that Congress intended to promote by the substantive federal law in ques-
tion.' 0 Perhaps DelCostello is the only case in which the smooth function-
ing of federal law has been interfered with to such an extent that a uniform
rule is necessary.
5. The Substance and Process of Implication
Two of the most intriguing aspects of the implication process are char-
acterizing the federal claim and finding the most appropriate analogue. The
Court has described this process as finding a statute of limitations that
bears a "family resemblance"' 0 5 or "similarities in purpose and structure" to
the federal cause of action.'0 6 This process of characterizing the federal
cause of action and determining the most analogous statute of limitations is
a task at which courts may be very proficient.
Recent cases have developed both the substantive and procedural com-
ponents of the implication process. 07 One aspect is the proximity or similar-
ity of the two statutory provisions in terms of their purposes, language, and
remedies. 10 8 Legislative intention is an important factor in determining simi-
larity between a federal and state cause of action.'0 9 Furthermore, the courts
have looked-to the nature of injuries that the statutes attempt to correct,
the prevalence of similar statutory purposes or objectives (such as compen-
sation for victims and deterrence), and whether the statutory schemes re-
present similar legislative approaches for dealing with a problem."0
102. Id.
103. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 275.
104. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. at 696, 702 (1965).
105. Id. at 705 n.7.
106. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 152 (1987).
107. See, e.g., id. at 147; DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,
165-66 (1983).
108. See, e.g., UPS, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1981)(Stewart, J., concurring).
109. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. at 151-52.
110. For example, in Agency Holding Corp. v. MaUey-Duff & Associates, Inc., the Court
held the civil RICO action was more analogous with the private right of action under the Clay-
ton Act than with other state and federal statutory schema. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-
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This implication process appears to stress points of congruity or incon-
gruity between statutory schema for the purpose of determining the "most
apt" or more appropriate limitations period to imply."1 The process sug-
gests there is one "most" appropriate statutory scheme that should be bor-
rowed by analogy to supply a statute of limitations.
IV. IMPLICATION ANALYSIS AND THE MOST APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS FOR SECTION 10(b) ACTIONS
The implication analysis developed by the Supreme Court in its recent
cases lends itself to a consideration of the most apt or appropriate statute of
limitation to be applied in cases brought under Rule 10b-5, which imple-
ments section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Those cases articu-
late a broader statement of the familiar legal principles that form the ana-
lytic framework for implying an appropriate limitations period.
The lower courts, until recently, have almost exclusively looked to the
most analogous state statute, usually a state fraud or securities antifraud
regulation statute of limitations."' The following section reviews the state
borrowing approach to providing a limitations period in Rule 10b-5 cases
and discuss some of the criticisms of this approach.
The second section describes recent cases that have introduced two fed-
eral statutes of limitations in the contest for the most apt limitations period.
Three influential circuit courts of appeal have recently departed from the
state borrowing approach and have adopted statutes of limitations designed
for federal securities law rights of action. These decisions represent a signifi-
cant departure from the path of the contemporary implication analysis. The
concluding section applies the current implication analysis to suggest the
most appropriate resolution to the problem of an absent statute of limita-
tions in Rule 10b-5 cases.
A. Contemporary Application of Implication Analysis in Rule 10b-5
Cases
The lower federal courts, until recently, have looked solely to state stat-
Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. at 151. The Court held the private RICO action was closer be-
cause both statutes were designed to correct economic injuries, the legislative history of RICO
demonstrated a conscious patterning after the Clayton Act right of action, and both statutes
had virtually identical remedies. Id.
111. The Supreme Court has used a variety of terms to describe the process of characteri-
zation and analogue. In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., the Court stated the standard was
whether the claims bore a "close resemblance." UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696,
705 n.7 (1965). In DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, the Court addressed the
judicial inquiry as finding a "more apt" analogy, and claims bearing a "family resemblance" or
"close similarity" to each other. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. at
169-70.
112. See generally, T. HAZEN, supra note 1, § 13.8, at 722.
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utes to determine the most appropriate statute of limitations to be applied
in Rule lOb-5 actions. 1"3 For many years after the federal courts recognized a
private right of action for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the
courts applied the forum state's statute of limitations for common law
fraud.11 Those courts believed the state common law fraud action was most
analogous to Rule 10b-5 actions because of the strong similarities in ele-
ments of the statutory and common law claims and the remedies applied by
courts." 5 Clearly, however, misunderstandings about the meaning of the
Holmberg doctrine, particularly the insistence of some courts that only state
statutes could be consulted to imply a limitations period, contributed to the
rather limited search performed by many courts.
Later, states began enacting state blue sky statutes, which governed the
registration and exemption of securities issuances and prohibited disclosure
of misleading and fraudulent information in connection with the sale or
purchase of securities. The state blue sky statutes became the most appro-
priate statute from which to borrow a statute of limitations."' These stat-
utes were often patterned after the structure and organization of the federal
securities laws, and, more specifically, expressly prohibited fraudulent, de-
ceptive, and manipulative practices in a manner identical to the prohibitions
of Rule 10b-5. 11 7
State blue sky statutes of limitations have frequently been implied by
federal courts as the most appropriate source from which to borrow a limita-
tions period in Rule 10b-5 cases. Those courts have determined that the
Rule 10b-5 claim is very similar to state blue sky statutory claims and that
the federal and state statutory schemes have common purposes.'1 8 Some
113. See id. § 13.8, at 722-24.
114. See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
115. See, e.g., Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., 649 F.2d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1980)(allegations
of complaint that resemble action for fraud are governed by California statute of limitations for
fraud).
116. See, e.g., Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1986); Fried-
lander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1986).
117. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 502.401-.407 (1989). The Iowa blue sky law provides in rele-
vant part:
502.401 Offers, sales and purchases
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer to sell, offer to
purchase, sale or purchase of any security in this state, directly or indirectly:
1. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
2. To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading; or
3. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Id. § 502.401.
The Iowa blue sky law also provides time limitations on rights of action brought for viola-
tions of section 502.401. Id. § 502.504.
118. See, e.g., Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., 649 F.2d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1980). The an-
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courts, however, have noted that state blue sky statutes do not expressly
provide a cause of action for certain plaintiffs suing under Rule 10b-5, but
have, nevertheless, applied the applicable statute of limitations.,,
The widespread use of state blue sky and common law fraud statutes of
limitations has been roundly criticized by courts and commentators."20 The
principal criticisms concern the lack of certainty-to both securities fraud
victims and defendants-caused by application of the state borrowing doc-
trine and the litigation complexity added by use of the doctrine. 121
B. The Contrary View: Resort to a Uniform Federal Statute of
Limitations
Three circuit courts of appeal have recently departed from the prevail-
ing policy of borrowing state statutes of limitations in Rule 10b-5 cases. 22
Those courts have reasoned that the Supreme Court's pronouncement in the
Agency Holding Corp. case permits the application of a uniform federal
statute of limitations in section 10(b) cases. 123 Moreover, the courts have
refused to apply the state borrowing doctrine, reasoning that a federal stat-
ute of limitations provided in the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securi-
tifraud provision of the Uniform Securities Act, which has been adopted by approximately
thirty-six states, was adopted from or patterned after Rule lOb-5. H. SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: BLUE SKY REGULATION § 6.02, at 6-8 (1990). Moreover, it has com-
monly been recognized that there is a great congruity and similarity between Rule 10b-5 and
state blue sky fraud claims. Martin, Statutes of Limitations in lOb-5 Actions: Which State
Statute is Applicable?, 29 Bus. LAW. 443, 459 (1974); Raskin & Enyart, Which Statute of Limi-
tations in a l0b-5 Action?, 51 DENVER L.J. 301, 316 (1974).
119. See, e.g., Wood v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1981). The
state blue sky laws vary in their coverage; therefore, they do not cover all types of claims ac-
tionable under Rule 10b-5. For example, some blue sky laws do not provide a right of action for
defrauded sellers or for a broker's churning. These activities are actionable under Rule 10b-5.
Unfortunately, there is no precise fit between the state statutory causes of action and claims
under Rule 10b-5. See ABA Comm. on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task
Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus. LAW. 645, 648-9 (1986)[hereinaf-
ter ABA Task Force Report]. However, as a general matter, there is a close fit between Rule
10b-5 and most blue sky fraud claims in terms of their elements, objectives, and their reference
to state common law fraud claims. See supra note 116; see generally H. SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH,
supra note 118, at § 6.02.
120. See, e.g., Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943
(1987) (refers to state borrowing doctrine as "a ramshackle edifice"); Bloomenthal, The Statute
of Limitations and Rule lOb-5 Claims: A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 235,
239-46 (1989); ABA Task Force Report, supra note 119, at 646-47.
121. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 119, at 647. The authors argue the state
borrowing doctrine promotes forum shopping by defrauded plaintiffs. Furthermore, they claim
it is unfair because there is no uniform rule limiting the maintenance of private actions and
these are problems of uncertainty and inconsistency. Id.
122. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Data Access
Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc).
123. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Data
Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988)(en banc).
HeinOnline  -- 40 Drake L. Rev. 243 1991
Drake Law Review [Vol. 40
ties Exchange Act are the most appropriate.124 Those courts, however, have
failed to perform the analysis required by the Supreme Court in its recent
decisions and have merely concluded that a uniform statute should apply.12
The courts did not find the policies of the borrowed state statutes conflicted
with federal policies underlying section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.
In In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation,126 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals relied on the Agency Holding Corp. decision. It rejected
the state statutory claim-by-claim approach used by other federal courts
and applied the limitations periods expressly provided for other sections of
the Securities Exchange Act. 12 7 The court expressed the belief that it must
select only one appropriate limitations period for all Rule 10b-5 claims. 2 '
The statutes of limitations in the several provisions of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act were found to be more appropriate because they had purposes
and statutory objectives similar to those in section 10(b) and were designed
to create similar remedies. 2 9 Moreover, the court concluded the statutes of
limitations under state blue sky laws varied widely and that it would not be
possible to ensure a uniform limitations period if repose must be borrowed
from state statutory limitations periods.2
124. See, e.g., Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 361-64 (2d Cir. 1990).
125. For example, in Ceres Partners, the court commences its analysis by arguing the
state borrowing doctrine has created a lack of national uniformity. Id. at 354-55. The court,
then, notes the practice of borrowing state limitations periods has not been required by Su-
preme Court cases and recent Court cases "leave open the possibility that courts should look to
a federal statute instead." Id. at 355. After reviewing the recent Supreme Court cases involving
implication of limitations periods, the court in Ceres Partners states that a uniform federal
limitations period may be implied:
(1) where the statutory claim in question covers a multiplicity of types of actions,
leading to the possible application of a number of different types of state statutes of
limitations, (2) where the federal claim does not precisely match any state-law claim,
(3) where the challenged action is multistate in nature, perhaps leading to forum
shopping and inordinate litigation expense, and (4) where a federal statute provides a
very close analogy.
Id. at 357.
126. In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc).
127. Id. at 1550.
128. Id. at 1544. The court reasoned a single limitations period was appropriate because
according to the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, a factual and claim-based approach
"would not promote '[tihe federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of
unnecessary litigation.'" Id. at 1543 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985)). The
court pointed out actions under section 10(b), like claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "embrace a
galaxy of actions" and a claim-based approach would involve great uncertainty and inefficient
litigation. Id.
129. Id. at 1548. The court canvassed sections 9(e), 16(b), 18(c), and 29(b) of the 1934
Act, all of which, except section 16(b) have an identical limitations period, and concluded the
limitations period common to all 1934 Act provisions (except section 16(b)) should be applied.
Id.
130. Id. at 1549. The court concluded it would be "bizarre if not anomalous" to go beyond
the express provisions in the 1934 Act and resort to nonuniform state limitations periods. Id.
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More recently, the Seventh Circuit, in Short v. Belleville Shoe Manu-
facturing Co.,' 3s and the Second Circuit, in Ceres Partners v. GEL Associ-
ates,32 similarly concluded that a uniform federal statute of limitations
should be applied in Rule 10b-5 cases. These courts reasoned that applica-
tion of the state borrowing doctrine injects unnecessary complexity into the
implication analysis and that a federal securities law limitations period is a
more apt or appropriate source.133
Those courts, however, failed to systematically perform the implication
analysis required by the Supreme Court. They merely reasoned that the
state borrowing doctrine is complex and that resorting to a uniform limita-
tions period would simplify litigation. 34 These courts failed to analyze the
implication issue within the framework of familiar legal principles estab-
lished in the Court's recent borrowing cases.
C. The Implication Analysis in Rule 10b-5 Cases
In Holmberg, the Court held the implication analysis should consist of a
"judicial determination within the general framework of familiar legal prin-
ciples."' 35 Those legal principles have been explained with great care, al-
though not with clear consistency, in the Supreme Court's most recent deci-
sions on the implication analysis. In the following sections those principles
are discussed in the context of implying an appropriate limitations period in
claims brought under Rule 10b-5.
The Supreme Court's modern implication analysis is based on expli-
cated policy considerations and requires a federal court searching for a limi-
tations period perform a balancing analysis. This analysis stresses the skills
that judges are commonly considered to possess, the skills of claim charac-
Obviously, the Supreme Court's implication analysis would not consider the process of seriously
evaluating state analogies as either bizarre or anomalous.
131. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990).
132. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
133. The courts in both Short and Ceres Partners concluded a uniform federal limita-
tions period was the desired outcome to the issue of implying a limitations period, but they
could not agree on the most appropriate source for such a uniform federal rule. The court in
Short decided section 13 of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988), should be applied
to determine the limitations period in Rule 10b-5 cases. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg., 908 F.2d
at 1392. The court in Ceres Partners decided two candidates under the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act, sections 9(e) and 18(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(e) and 78r(c), provided a better outcome.
Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d at 362.
134. See, e.g., Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d at 1387-89. The court referred
to its prior decisions, and those of other circuit courts, in adopting state statutes of limitation
as having done so "on auto-pilot." Id. at 1387. Moreover, the court stressed the obligation of
courts creating implied causes of action, such as under Rule 10b-5, to also "create stable peri-
ods of limitations for their handiwork." Id. (citing Smith v. Chicago, 769 F.2d 408 (7th Cir.
1985)).
135. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (citing Board of Comm'rs v. United
States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50, 351-52 (1939)).
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terization and analogy. In addition, the analysis promotes a relationship be-
tween the federal policies underlying the private right of action and a period
of repose.
1. Repose
At this late point, it is simply untenable to conclude that Congress' fail-
ure to articulate a limitations period for Rule 10b-5 claims indicates a legis-
lative desire for no limitations period. In performing an implication analysis
in Rule 10b-5 cases, there is room for dispute about two issues concerning
the most appropriate form of judicially created repose for Rule 10b-5 cases.
Those issues are: (1) whether there is a clear policy that a period of repose
should be designed rather than a limitations period; and (2) what type of
policies are advanced by Rule 10b-5 claims and how those policies can guide
the determination of the most appropriate limitations period.
Judge Easterbrook, in his opinion in Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co.,
strongly promotes section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 as the most apt
analogue because it is a statute of repose rather than statute of limita-
tions.13 As the court in Short correctly observed, the effect of selecting sec-
tion 13 is to preclude the application of equitable tolling doctrines in Rule
10b-5 cases. 137 However, an acknowledged policy promoting the finality of a
repose provision over the flexibility of a statute of limitations does not exist.
It appears that the flexibility provided by the equitable tolling doctrines
may have strong policy implications when the cause of action, as in Rule
10b-5 cases, is directed at the defendant's fraudulent conduct.
Moreover, important policies under Rule 10b-5 are implicated by the
selection of any period of limitations. Rule lOb-5 was intended to target
practices and activities that might be characterized as fraudulent and mis-
representative, deceitful or manipulative. The Rule was apparently pat-
terned after section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act,'3 8 except that the Rule
136. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d at 1391. The court in Short rejected the
plaintiff's claim that the five-year limitations period in section 20A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78t-1, should be uniformly applied to all Rule 10b-5 actions for the reason that insider trading
is only "one atypical kind of violation" of Rule 10b-5 and should not be uniformly applied. Id.
at 1392; see also, Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d at 362-63 (rejecting plaintiffs' and
SEC's arguments that the limitations period in section 20A should be applied in Rule 10b-5
cases).
137. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1990). Courts have
created various equitable doctrines when determining whether a claimant's demand for relief is
barred. Those doctrines include equitable tolling (such as by fraudulent concealment by the
wrongdoer) and equitable estoppel. See,e.g., Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th
Cir. 1980); see generally T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 727-30.
138. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides as follows:
Sec. 17. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
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reaches misstatements or omissions of material facts occurring in connection
with either a purchase or sale of security. 13 9 In significant part, Rule 10b-5 is
intended to prevent fraud or manipulative activities affecting the price of
securities, whether they are traded in national or even unorganized markets.
The background concerning the creation of Rule 10b-5 is somewhat
helpful in describing the policy implications of any repose provisions made
applicable to Rule 10b-5 cases. Because the Rule was intended to attack
fraudulent activities, a limitations period should be flexible enough to recog-
nize fraudulent conduct, by its nature, is often hidden or clandestine. This
suggests equitable tolling doctrines might best advance the purpose of pun-
ishing fraud, even when it is hidden, and any borrowed limitations statute
should permit resort to those doctrines. The Rule was also intended to apply
to prohibited activities in transactions not involving public or organized
markets for the sale and purchase of securities. This fact gives the meaning
and nature of the Rule a decidedly local flavor and suggests it was intended
to assist the sophisticated as well as the unsophisticated securities trader.
This analysis suggests the borrowed limitations period should not be a
repose provision. Such a definite period would conflict with the policies of
Rule 10b-5 that foster private remedial actions to recover for fraudulent,
deceptive, and manipulative conduct. It must be recognized, however, that
some provisions of the federal securities laws, which were intended to pre-
vent fraudulent and manipulative conduct, expressly provide a period of
repose. 140
2. Federalism
Contemporary implication analysis requires consideration of federalism
issues in determining the most appropriate limitations period. These issues
concern the relationship between federal statutory policy and analogous
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
139. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act is limited to fraudulent or misrepresentative state-
ments or omissions occurring in connection with the sale of a security. See T. HAZEN, supra
note 1, at 669.
140. One federal statute of limitations that has been borrowed by a court looking for a
uniform federal limitations period is section 13 of the 1933 Securities Act. This statutory provi-
sion provides that a claimant must maintain an action within one year of discovery of the
fraudulent conduct, or in all instances no more than three years from the date of the violation.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988). The definiteness of the period of repose made the borrowing of this
provision attractive to the court in Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d at 1385.
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state statutes that may be borrowed to find an appropriate statute of limita-
tions. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is impermissible to
borrow a state statute of limitations when the underlying state statutory
claim conflicts with the policy of the federal claim. A second issue concerns
the primacy of state law to federal law in finding the most apt limitations
period to be borrowed.
The federalism issue does not appear to be determinative in the context
of Rule 10b-5 claims, but it has important implications. The state policies
underlying common law fraud actions do not conflict with the antifraud
principles of Rule 10b-5. Rather, it appears that the courts have been inter-
preting Rule 10b-5 in harmony with the elements of state common law fraud
actions.""
One issue presents a matter of considerable, perhaps instrumental, sig-
nificance. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has implied that state law
must be initially considered for purposes of finding the most appropriate
analogue and that a federal statute of limitations may be used only when
the state statute is inadequate for service as a surrogate limitations pe-
riod. " " This principle, if it reflects the judgment of the Court, would limit
the search for an appropriate statute of limitations in Rule 10b-5 cases to
state common law fraud or blue sky statutes of repose only.
This reading appears incorrect for several reasons. First, other Supreme
Court cases have seemingly retreated from this primacy of state law per-
spective and have held that reference to state law is not a preference or
presumption, but is a process oriented "rule of thumb" for courts perform-
ing an implication analysis.1 3 The rule from these cases is that unless no
state cause of action can supply an appropriate limitations period, then the
most analogous state claim should be used to supply a time bar. ""' The cases
also hold that when no state cause of action is sufficiently analogous to the
federal claim, then the court can decline to adopt any state rule and look to
federal law to supply a limitations period.1 45 In that instance, the court must
find that the federal analogue is closer than any state analogue and that
141. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), on remand 562 F.2d 4 (2d
Cir. 1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Supreme Court has been
applying common law principles in Rule 10b-5 cases with the effect of limiting the private right
of action under the Rule. T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 723. In Santa Fe the Court insisted the
operative language in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 be read in accordance with well-recognized
and commonly held connotations of fraudulent, deceitful, or manipulative conduct. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 476-77; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199.
142. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985).
143. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323 (1989); DelCostello v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 (1983).
144. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. at 323-24; DelCostello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. at 171.
145. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. at 324; DelCostello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. at 172.
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federal policies and "the practicalities of litigation" make the federal ana-
logue more appropriate."
The recent cases applying a federal securities law statute of limitations
have misinterpreted the Supreme Court's recent cases by refusing to con-
sider the aptness of state law analogues. For example, in the Short case, the
court never considered the issue of the primacy of state rules of limitation,
nor did the court perform any careful process of analogizing the state and
federal statutes. Rather, the court in Short presumed the Court's decision in
Agency Holding Co. permitted lower courts to go directly to federal statutes
for an analogue without considering relevant state analogues. 47
Finally, it is not clear that the application of borrowed state limitations
periods is inconsistent or conflicts with the policies of section 10(b) or Rule
10b-5. The federal statutory provisions often relied on by courts to supply a
uniform limitations period (i.e., section 9(e) and section 18(a) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act and section 13 of the 1933 Securities Act) were
passed in 1933 and 1934, long before a private right of action was recognized
under Rule 10b-5. In 1975, however, Congress enacted the "most substantial
and significant revision" of the 1933 and 1934 acts knowing the federal
courts routinely borrowed state laws to supply a limitations period, but did
not choose to provide any express limitations period. 148 Clearly, Congress
did not perceive that the implication of state limitations period interfered
with federal interests or policies.1 4
9
3. Uniformity
Uniformity and predictability in the application of a limitations period
are significant factors to courts attempting to derive a federal limitations
period to Rule 10b-5 actions.8 0 In particular, the concern has been ex-
pressed that reliance on the state borrowing analysis might require courts to
146. Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. at 324; DelCostello v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. at 172.
147. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1990). The court's
analysis gave short shrift to the notion that state laws should first be examined to determine if
an appropriate fit could be made. The court noted state blue sky laws were frequently con-
sulted but "[firom the perspective of practitioners litigating cases ... the situation is a
nightmare." Id. According to the court, lawyers and judges have devoted "untold hours to iden-
tifying proper state analogies and applying multiple (conflicting or cumulative) tolling doc-
trines." Id. Aside from these anecdotal references, the court fails to identify the reason that
state blue sky statutes make poor analogues for claims of fraud and manipulation under Rule
lob-5.
148. Cf. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
149. Arguably, Congress' failure in 1975 to provide an express statute of limitation for
Rule lOb-5, or section 10(b), emphasizes the presumption articulated in many implication cases
that Congress' failure to provide an express time limit reflects the choice to apply a state time
bar. See supra note 41.
150. See, e.g., Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d at 1389; In re Data Access Sys.
Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1549 (3d Cir. 1988).
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 40 Drake L. Rev. 249 1991
Drake Law Review
imply state limitation periods from several states. 1 Furthermore, the prob-
lem of intra-circuit conflicts has also been raised to argue that uniformity
requires adoption of one federal limitations period.162 It appears, however,
that the issue of uniformity described in the Supreme Court's decisions has
been misapplied in some cases holding that a uniform federal rule is the
appropriate policy for Rule 10b-5 litigation. 1 3
The issue of uniformity was important to the Supreme Court in Wilson
v. Garcia, in which the Court held that federal interests in "uniformity, cer-
tainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation" favored application
of a single limitations period within the same jurisdiction.15 In Wilson, the
Court approved a single characterization for all claims under the federal
civil rights statute.1 5 5 The Wilson Court, however, did not explain the mean-
ing of the term "uniformity" or how uniformity of limitations periods signif-
icantly advanced the policies underlying federal statutory or implied causes
of action that have no express limitations period. Apparently, the notion of
uniformity could be construed to completely abrogate the state borrowing
doctrine. However, the Court in Wilson actually advanced the state borrow-
ing doctrine by concluding state tort law should be the source of
implication. 6
It appears the issue of uniformity, raised by the Court in Wilson, is
about transactional efficiency (i.e., to increase the efficiency of federal courts
in determining the most appropriate limitations period to apply in individ-
ual Rule 10b-5 cases). This would create a rule requiring a court borrow only
one of its state's statutes to imply a limitations period. The litigation costs
of searching for the most appropriate limitations period and analyzing the
effect of each such period would be reduced or eliminated. 6 '
151. See, e.g., Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 354-55 (2d Cir. 1990). The
Ceres Partners court stressed "securities regulation is national in scope and in need of uniform
rules," and then provided a useful survey of the varying treatment given to the issue of the
most appropriate limitations period in Rule 10b-5 litigation. Id. The court noted that as a
result of the variety of borrowed state periods, a plaintiff in one suit may be time barred, but
an identical suit in another jurisdiction would not be time barred. Id.
152. See, e.g., In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d. at 1549. The court in In re
Data Access Systems argued that the need for uniform federal remedies in securities cases re-
quired courts to look to some federal statute of limitations whenever a Rule lOb-5 case is liti-
gated. Id. The court expressed the concern that resort to state statutory or common law norms
for characterizing the federal cause of action under Rule 10b-5 would hopelessly complicate the
process of administering the policies of the federal securities laws. Id.
153. The courts applying a uniform federal limitations period have stressed the impor-
tance of uniformity of a federal time bar, but they have not articulated the same reasons.
154. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985).
155. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
156. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 275.
157. This is essentially what the Court in Wilson v. Garcia did when it decided the issue
of multiple applicable state limitations periods. See generally Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235
(1989).
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The substance of the lower court's "uniformity" argument, however, re-
ally goes to the question of whether state limitations periods should ever be
borrowed to imply a federal limitations period. Any time a court resorts, as
a matter of federal policy, to an appropriate state limitations period, there
exists the possibility federal courts may have to consider and apply fifty
limitations periods.1 58 In other words, the argument for national uniformity
proves too much: a uniform national period must always be located, and it is
never appropriate to borrow a state limitations period.1 This conclusion is
contradicted by Wilson v. Garcia.
4. The Process of Claim Characterization and Analogy
The process of claim characterization and analogy requires that courts
attempt to determine the characteristics of a federal claim and, then, deter-
mine if the federal claim is closely similar to, or dissimilar from, a state
claim. The process of characterization and analogy permits the courts to
treat like things alike and gives some assurance that a common limitations
period will be applied to claims that have similar characteristics.
In the context of claims brought under Rule 10b-5, the courts taking a
traditional approach to the implication process characterized the plaintiff's
claims in accordance with state common law actions for fraud, misrepresen-
tation, or deceit.16 0 Other courts characterized the Rule 10b-5 claim as simi-
lar to actions recognized under state blue sky laws. The fit between the
plaintiff's federal claim and the analogous state claim was not always per-
fect, and courts were required to determine the most analogous state claim.
Recent cases holding that a uniform federal limitations period is the
most appropriate analogue have performed almost no characterization of the
158. In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., Justice White, in a dissenting opinion with Jus-
tices Douglas and Brennan, made the same arguments asserted by the lower federal courts
concerning the goal of uniformity in selecting a uniform federal time bar. UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 710-13 (1965). Justice White asserted that congressional silence
regarding time limits did not mean Congress intended to apply diverse state laws. Id. at 710.
He argued "there is no sense or justice in referring to 50 or more different statutes of limita-
tions," depending on the state in which suit may be brought. Id. at 712. He also noted the
complex administrative difficulties facing lower courts in determining which state's period of
limitations to apply. Id. at 712-13.
159. It has been persuasively argued that the lack of uniformity is alone an insufficient
justification for refusal to borrow a state period of limitations.
Federalism does not preclude a federal court from applying the state statute [of limi-
tations]. . . . Neither does the interest in uniformity preclude absorption of state
statutes of limitations. Although the time period for the same federal claim will inevi-
tably vary among the states, mere disharmony does not justify mandatory judicial
creation of uniform federal limitations periods. Nor does this interstate variation
alone conflict with federal interests; only a conflict of state law with basic federal
policies would justify such mandatory judicial intervention.
Special Project, supra note 1, at 1029-30.
160. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff's claims to determine if the state analogue (e.g., common law fraud
or blue sky provision) is the most appropriate. Rather, those cases have rea-
soned that a uniform federal rule is the appropriate outcome of the implica-
tion process and that the only important issue concerns locating the most
appropriate federal limitations period. 6' The process of characterization
and analogy fashioned by the Supreme Court, however, is premised on an
evaluation of state analogues prior to an evaluation of federal analogues and
on the policy that federal time bars will be consulted only when the state
statutory candidates conflict with or thwart the federal interests.
For purposes of analysis, the characterization and analogy process in
Rule 10b-5 cases should be guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Wil-
son v. Garcia rather than Agency Holding Co. In Wilson, the Court ana-
lyzed the appropriate limitations period for section 1983, the federal anti-
discrimination law. The statute was intended to reach conduct that usually
occurred at the state or local level, and the federal statute had elements
closely similar to elements in state law claims. The Court held the similarity
between section 1983 claims and state tort claims required that section 1983
claims be characterized as, and analogized to, tort claims.'6 2
A Rule 10b-5 action often addresses conduct occurring at the state or
local level and contains elements similar to state fraud claims and identical
to many state blue sky statutes. 16 3 Moreover, the relationship between ele-
ments of the federal cause of action (e.g., fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, or
manipulation) and claims at state law are very close. Indeed, the state law
claims and causes of action have often served to define the meaning of Rule
10b-5 claims.'64
The federal racketeering statute in Agency Holding Corp. was quite dif-
ferent than the statutory provision of concern in Wilson. Congress expressly
patterned the racketeering private right of action after section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act. The language used in the RICO provision was very similar to, and
often identical to, that of the Clayton Act. 6" Moreover, the legislative his-
161. See, e.g., Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1387-90 (7th Cir. 1990).
162. The Wilson Court's analysis was guided by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that
federal jurisdiction of, inter alia, section 1983 claims shall be consistent with federal law except
when no federal law exists then state law shall be applied. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The Wilson
Court held that section 1988 "implicitly endorsed" the Court's implication analysis insofar as it
adopts state time limitations as federal law. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-77 (1985).
163. It has been argued that violations of Rule 10b-5 often involve interstate transactions
and the reach of the federal securities laws is nationwide. That is certainly true, although a
great deal of Rule 10b-5 litigation involves localized fraudulent activity or, as it is sometimes
referred to, "garden variety fraud." Moreover, the fact that some conduct reached by Rule 10b-
5 occurs in interstate commerce proves nothing; much of the discrimination reached by section
1983 is multistate in nature and scope.
164. The close analogies between state claims for fraud, deceit, and manipulation and the
conduct challenged in Rule 10b-5 cases are unmistakable. See supra note 141; see also supra
note 118 and accompanying text.
165. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a private right of action for "[any person who
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tory of the RICO right of action demonstrates that it was expressly pat-
terned after section 4 of the Clayton Act. ' 6
Rule 10b-5 has no such strikingly similar counterpart. Rule 10b-5 was
patterned after section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, a statutory provi-
sion that has recently been found by some courts to lack a private right of
action. 6 ' Although there is no express statute of limitations for claims
under section 17(a), the courts have uniformly applied the most analogous
state limitations period in the forum state. 6 ' The decisional law of the most
analogous federal statutory provision also favors the adoption of the state
borrowing doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent implication analysis articulates a "frame-
work of general legal principles" that are intended to be applied when Con-
gress has failed to provide an express statute of limitations. The analysis
requires a consideration of those principles in the context of a process that
presumes a priori the suitability of state law as the most appropriate source
for borrowing a repose period. The principles and process are designed to
determine the most apt limitations period.
The characterization and analogy process requires a conclusion on
whether Rule 10b-5 is "closer" to state common law, blue sky claims, or
federal securities claims. The state common law fraud claims are closer to
Rule 10b-5 claims because state fraud concepts were used to create section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Similarly, the state claims have been used to inform
decisions about the meaning of Rule 10b-5 claims. The state blue sky stat-
utes are frequently patterned after section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The pro-
cess concludes that Rule 10b-5 claims should be analogized to state fraud or
blue sky statutes because the states claims are close analogues to Rule 10b-
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States ... and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit including reasonable attorney's fee." 15
U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988). Under RICO, a private right of action is provided to "[any person in-
jured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue
therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages
he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1988).
166. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151-52 (1987)
(noting Congress' " 'reliance on the Clayton Act model,'" and "use of antitrust model for the
development of remedies against organized crime") (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 489 (1985)).
167. T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 772 n.10 (collecting cases in which courts have found an
implied right of action under section 17(a)). Professor Hazen also points out the current trend
among the courts is to refuse to imply a private right of action under section 17(a). Id. at 772
n.11 (collecting cases).
168. See, e.g., Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied 454 U.S. 895 (1981); see generally, T. HAZEN, supra note 1, at 776.
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5. Finally, the courts should apply the presumption that state law should be
borrowed because there is no compelling reason to reject application of state
law. Therefore, the courts should apply the statute of limitations applicable
to those state causes of action in federal Rule 10b-5 cases.
The courts' implication analysis, in the context of Rule 10b-5 cases, is
conflicting and needs further resolution by the Supreme Court. Some cases
appear to apply an earlier form of implication analysis and proceed from the
assumption that state law must be found to supply a limitations period.
More recent cases, decided after the development of the more comprehen-
sive analysis, have failed to properly consider the importance of state law in
the modern implication analysis.
A proper application of the Court's implication analysis concludes that
courts should borrow state limitations periods for common law fraud and
blue sky law violations to supply a limitations period. Courts should pre-
sumptively apply state law unless it conflicts with the policies of Rule 10b-5
or is clearly inadequate to perform the objectives of the Rule.
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